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Abstract
We develop full equilibrium analyses of product markets involving
response surface modelling of marketing variables, thereby gener-
alising the works of Lane (1980), in economics, and Hauser and Shugan
(1983), in marketing. We show how optimal new product entry (attack)
strategies and optimal defense strategies for existing brands can be
determined. We also illustrate the critical role played by response
surface modelling in prescribing optimal strategies.

Attack-Defense Marketing Strategies
—
A Full Equilibrium Analysis Based on
Response Function Models
1 . Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of developing an optimal entry
strategy for a new product in a competitive environment. Most new
products are introduced into markets with existing competitive
products. The entry of a new product (attacker) into such an environ-
ment is likely to provoke responses from some or all of the existing
products (termed defenders). This paper investigates the development
of an optimal entry strategy for an attacker based on an understand-
ing of the possible reactions of the defenders.
In so doing, we demonstrate clearly the impact of using response
function models for advertising and distribution on the derivation of
optimal attack-defense strategies. We show that defense using only
distribution and/or advertising strategies is inappropriate. Optimal
defense in price alone is suboptimal. Therefore, optimal defense, in
markets where response function models for advertising and distribu-
tion are valid, necessitates the use of all three marketing variables,
when defender position (product) is held constant. Specifically, we
show that optimal defense dictates lowering price and reducing adver-
tising and distribution expenditures.
A market with three products (two defenders and one attacker) is
used to illustrate our general results. Full equilibrium analyses
coupled with the model used allows the development of propositions
regarding the relationship between market structure variables (total
demand, consumer income), performance variables (profits, market
-?-
share) and strategy variables (price, position, advertising and
distribution)
.
Past Literature in Brief
Past work that we build on has largely appeared in two streams:
(1) micro-economics, and (ii) analytical marketing literature.
Economists have developed detailed models describing competitive
behavior in markets characterized by homogeneous products, perfect
information, and identical, noncolluding consumers and firms. Ex-
cellent reviews are provided by Lancaster (1980), Lane (1980),
Scherer (1980), Schmalansee (1981, 1982), and Stigler (1964).
Considerable work in the analytical marketing literature has
been done on developing new product entry strategies. This litera-
ture provides guidelines for the selection of specific couponing,
initial advertising design, dealing and sampling. This literature
also develops algorithms for determining the optimal position (brand
features) of the new brand without explicitly considering defensive
reactions on the part of existing brands. Excellent reviews are
available in Shocker and Srinivasan (1979), Urban and Hauser (1980),
Wind (1982), Pessemier (1982), Sudharshan (1982), May, Shocker, and
Sudharshan (1983)
.
This body of knowledge does not, in any integrated fashion, pre-
scribe how an entrant firm should optimally position its new brand,
choose advertising expenditures, channel expenditures and price
—
given competitive reactions by defending firms in defense of their
existing brands. Notable exceptions to this paucity are the work in
marketing of Hauser and Shugan (1983) and in economics of Lane (1980)
-3-
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Hauser and Shugan (1983) ~ have investigated how defenders should
react when a new product enters their domain. Their work on defen-
sive marketing strategy assumes that the strategy a new product will
use is given. Their competitive market structure analysis is limited
to a partial equilibrium analysis.
Lane (1980) derives full equilibrium pricing and positioning
strategies for both the cases of endogenously and exogenously fixed
number of brands in the market place. However, he does not consider
major marketing strategy variables of advertising and distribution
explicitly in his analysis.
In this paper we develop a full equilibrium analysis consider-
ing the reactions of all the existing brands in the market (unlike H&S)
while explicitly including advertising and distribution levels as other
possible defensive response strategies in addition to price (unlike
Lane) .
Model Worldview
1. Consumers: They are assumed to be utility maximizers.
Utility is a function of brand characteristics, price and remaining
income available for other purchases.
2. Managers: We assume that they are profit maximizers and
rational competitors. Upon knowledge of number of products entering
market, they can compute optimal strategies to be competitive. The
attacker managers will use optimal market entry strategies of position,
price, advertising and distribution (i.e., 4 P's). On the other hand,
defender managers will defend their brands optimally through price,
advertising and distribution, not brand repositioning.
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3. Market structure: Our analysis assumes a market in which
brands already exist and are in equilibrium (i.e., no manager has any
incentive to modify any of his marketing mix strategy variables uni-
laterally). The optimal new product strategy we derive is for a
brand entering such a market. This strategy is based on the adjust-
ment of existing brands to this entrant. The entire market, including
the new brand, achieves a new equilibrium.
We proceed by first presenting the consumer and managerial models
in greater detail in Section 2. The next section (3) describes our
equilibrium analysis before and after attack. We show general re-
sults concerning optimal defensive strategies. We also provide re-
sults based on an example of new brand entry into a market containing
two existing brands. In Section 4, we present various propositions
concerning relationships between performance/strategies and market
parameters. We end this paper with a summary of our results and a
discussion of directions for future research.
2. The Models
We will .deal with a market for a single product class, with two
attributes, which can be differentiated. The model characterization
will closely follow Lane (1980) rather than H&S due to analytical
3
t ractability. We incorporate the marketing strategy variables of
advertising and distribution expenditures (from H&S) into Lane's model,
Consumer Side
Consumer tastes are distributed uniformly over a continuous
interval [0,1] and a randomly chosen consumer is represented by the
parameter a e [0,1]. Each customer is assumed to buy one unit of
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any brand (q(a) = 1 for all a e [0,1]). Assuming the uniform distri-
bution of consumers is f(a) = M, the total demand from this market is
1
/ q(o)f(o)do = M
units, where M is set exogenously.
Consumers are assumed to be maximizers of a Cobb-Douglas utility
function given by:
,,/ s a (l-a),„ ^U(a) = w
i
z
i
(Y-p.)
where (w.,z.) are the attribute values for a particular brand, p. is
its price and Y is the total dollar amount available to the consumer
by way of income. We assume that all consumers have the same income
Y. Then, the consumer type a weights the attribute values (w.,z.)
correspondingly with exponential weights of (a,l-a). The term (Y-p.)
in the utility function signifies the remaining amount of income
available to the consumer to spend in other markets.
The differences in this specification and that in H&S are that
(i) the latter use linearly weighted attributes which contribute
linearly to a consumer's utility, (ii) H&S incorporate price using
dollar-metric measurement methods by evaluating the utility value in
units per dollar value of the product, and (iii) the H&S model does
not incorporate any cross-effects between the product market they
analyse and the others that the consumer will necessarily deal in.
This interaction effect must be included (although not necessarily in
the form that we have chosen) if one is to analyse full equilibrium in
a specific market (Salop (1979), Lancaster (1978)).
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Managerial Side
We assume that brand managers are profit maximizers and have con-
trol over the decisions on brand positioning, in terms of levels for
the two attributes of their product, and other marketing decisions in
terms of price, advertising expenditures and distribution expendi-
tures. Each brand i faces the same technology constraint which is
described by w. + z. = 1. (This is similar to H&S assumption of
efficiently positioned brands.) The net effect is to reduce the
product attribute dimension to one, characterized by the ratio
4
f. = w./z. in Lane (1980) and the angle a. in H&S.ill & l
The profit function facing a brand manager who is in charge of
brand i is given by:
.(Pi. fcai , kdl ) (P1-OQ1A(kal)D(kdl ) - F - kai - kd .
where (p., k ., k,.) are the brand's price, advertising and distri-
i' ai di
bution expenditures, respectively, c is the marginal cost of produc-
tion and F is the fixed cost of production. Both parameters c and F
are assumed to be the same for all brands. Q. is the demand for
i
brand i and is given by
0. = S.'M
l l
where M is the total demand for the industry and Q. is the unadjusted
market share for brand i. It must be noted that 8. is dependent on
competition only in price and position of all the brands.
The functions A(k .) and D(k_.) are response functions relating
ai di
sales to the advertising and distribution expenditures respectively.
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Like H&S it is assumed that both functions A and D are concave or are
operating on the concave portion of S-shaped response curves.
Specifically, the functional form chosen for the response functions
is the ADBUDG curve, i.e.,
A(k
a
) = &1 + (a - a]L ) a
3
a
k
L
+ a,
a 3
D(kJ - b- + (b n-b,)d y 1 x "1" b b
k
d
+b
3
with parameters a_ , a,, a„ , a~, b
n
,
b..
,
b_ and b_.
Although the assumptions of concavity is not serious, the assump-
tion that the sales, for any brand, is affected by changed in the
expenditures on advertising and distribution through only the response
functions is stringent. As we shall see later in the analysis, this
has serious repercussions as far as defending strategy is concerned
if a brand is attacked by a new entry.
Competitive Interaction
It is assumed that brands enter the market sequentially—one at
a time. Each brand prior to entry knows the positions of the existing
brands. For the initial market equilibrium, we assume that, given
knowledge of the number of brands that might enter a market, every
potential entrant has perfect foresight and can determine the optimal
responses of all subsequent entrants to its own pricing, advertising,
distribution, and position decisions.
The computaCion of the equilibrium market structure involves the
separation between positioning strategies and the other marketing
strategies (this is because repositioning is not an allowed defensive
move). The optimal price, advertising, and distribution strategies
for all brands follow the concept of Nash equilibrium, i.e., given the
other brands' Nash strategies, no brand manager has any incentive to
unilaterally deviate from his Nash strategies.
3. General Results Under Full Equilibrium
As Lane (1980) points out, the equilibrium outcomes (the list of
optimal strategies, one for each firm, given that other firms follow
their optimal strategy) are analytically derivable and can be com-
puted numerically. The analytical derivations used in obtaining compu-
tational inputs are presented in the Appendix. We proceed to show the
optimal attack strategy for a new brand under different assumptions
regarding the reaction policies adopted by the defenders. And we
also show the impact of response function modeling on optimal defense
strategies.
Let us consider a market with two brands. These brands enter the
market sequentially and the first brand is assumed to have perfect
foresight regarding the second brand, i.e., it can compute the second
brand's optimal strategies with respect to its own strategies. It is
assumed that the second brand knows the position of the first brand
and that a Mash equilibrium will dictate the optimal strategies in
pricing, advertising and distribution for both brands. Computationally,
given every position pair for the two brands, the first brand manager
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is treated as being able to evaluate the Nash equilibrium in the other
strategies and thus, obtain the optimal (profit-maximizing) positioning
strategy of the second brand, i.e., he can compute the reaction func-
tion of the second brand. All that remains is for the first brand to
pick its own optimal profit-maximizing position given that the second
manager behaves according to the reaction function.
For the purposes of concrete illustration we chose the following
parameters for our market with two brands: M = market demand = 100
units, Y = income of each individual = $10, F = fixed cost = 0, and
C = marginal production cost = $1. Given these parameters, the
equilibrium structure that emerges for this two brand market is shown
in Table 1.
Table 1
Unadjusted
Advertising Distribution market
Brand Position Price expenditures expenditures share Profits
i= (w.,z.) (p.) (k .) (k,.) 0. IT.
l ' i rtS ai di _i l
1 (0.5,0.5) 6.56 26.7751 19.7033 .6362 353.78
2 (0.073,0.927) 5.32 14.6067 10.6153 .3638 157.30
or
(0.927,0.073)
[We have also assumed a~ = 2, a, = 1, a„ = 0.5, a» = 0.5, b~ = 1.5,
b, 1, b. 0.5, b- = 0.5 as parameters for the respective ADBUDG type
response functions for all firms.]
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Now consider an attacker poised to enter this market. Such an
entrant needs to consider possible defensive reactions by existing
brands. There are three possible defense strategies: (1) defensive
strategies involve only changing either advertising or distribution
expenditures, or both, (2) defense occurs through pricing strategies
alone, and (3) defense encompasses price, advertising, and distribu-
tion strategies.
Case 1
When the defenders use only advertising and/or distribution,
optimal attacking position turns out to be the same as the position
of the brand with the largest profits, i.e., brand 1. Its optimal
pricing strategy is to set a price lower than that of brand 1, and
given that consumer choice is based only upon prices and brand posi-
tions, the attacker takes the entire market share of the market
leader, brand 1. See Figure 1 for the brand position map.
0.<U1 -•
Brand 2 position
0.5 •
C.OT3 -•
Brand 1 and Attacker position
Brand 2 - alternative position
*. uj
0.015 O.S" o.^i
Figure 1. Optimal Brand Position: Case 1
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Recall that the effects of advertising and distribution expenditures
have been introduced via response functions:
* (V kai' kc,i> " ( "rc > iA(k ai )l'Ckdi ) " F " kai " kdi
and Q., the demand for brand i is a function only of the positions and
prices of all the brands in the market. For brands occupying the same
position, the one with the lowest price attracts all the demand that
accrues to this position. By the attacker's choice of brand l's posi-
tion as its own, and setting a lower price, demand for brand 1 is driven
to 0. So, advertising and distribution expenditures by brand 1 only
change the magnitude of negative profits obtained by brand 1 (through
- k . - k, .).
ai di
This argument is true no matter how many brands are in the market.
If the only permissible defensive strategies are advertising and dis-
tribution expenditures, the attacker's optimal strategy is to position
itself at the same position as the market leader (in profits), and to
charge a price lower than that charged by the leader. This implies
the general result:
Theorem 1 ; Given the structure of competition (in position and prices),
if an existing brand is attacked, it has to defend itself in price.
The results of H&S (Theorems 7 and 10) are partially true, i.e.
,
advertising and distribution expenditures will be lowered upon attack.
This just ensures that the defender reduces its costs—since it is
doomed to obtain onlv losses!
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Case 2
When defense is in prices alone, the market structure that obtains
is shown in Table 2. We have assumed that Brand 2 chooses the posi-
tion (0.073,0.927)—this does not effect the results because of the
symmetry of the problem as can be seen in Figure 1.
Table 2
Unadjusted
Advertising Distribution market
Brand Position Price expenditures expenditures share Profits
i = (w.,z.) (Pl ) <kai> <kdi> 8 i 1
1 (0.5,0.5) 1.9681 26.7751 19.7033 .4233 64.20
2 (0.073,0.927) 3.5571 14.6067 10.6153 .1562 78.68
3 (0.4205,0.5795) 2.0694 5.4794 3.8666 .4205 99.401
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we can clearly see that the new entrant
has chosen to position in the unattacked portion of the pre-entry
market of brand 1. After entry, prices and total profits in the market
have declined as has the individual profits and market shares of
brands 1 and 2. The profits for brands 1 and 2 can be raised over the
post-attack profits shown in Table 2 by decreasing advertising and
distribution. That this is due to the response function modelling of
advertising and distribution is clearly shown in the proof of the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 : Given the structure of competition (in position and
prices), upon attack, if a defending brand defends only in price, its
advertising and distribution expenditures are excessive.
-13-
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the marginal product of advertising and distribution
ot .
= (p.-c)Q.D(k,.) -sfSL - 1
9k . *1 i di 3k
ai ai
Jg- = (p^QjACk^) ^- - 1.di di
3tt . 3tt .
At the pre-entry stage, —— = —-— = at the optimal strategies.
3k
.
3k
,
ai ai
After entry, p. and Q. have reduced from pre-entry optimal levels.
This implies
3tt . 3tt
.
ai di
when pre-entry levels of advertising and distribution are maintained.
This in turn implies that pre-entry levels of advertising and distri-
bution expenditures are greater than the optimal level needed after
attack.
Theorem 1 demonstrates the necessity of defending in price and
Theorem 2 indicates that advertising and distribution expenditures
must be decreased upon attack. This gives rise to our main general
result which obtains for all models of this type, i.e., competitive
in price and position and response function modelling of advertising
and distribution.
Theorem 3 : When market demand M is constant, advertising and distri-
bution is modelled via response functions and consumer choice depends
only on price and position, the optimal defense strategies, upon
-14-
attack, must include decreasing price, advertising and distribution
levels.
The realization of this result for our example is shown in Case 3.
Case 3
When defensive strategies are permissible in price, advertising,
and distribution, the only changes to the results of Case 2 are that
the advertising and distribution expenditures for brands 1 and 2
change as does their corresponding profits. These are shown in
Table 3.
Table 3
Unadjusted
Advertising Distribution market
Brand Position Price expenditures expenditures share Profits
i- (w.,2.) (p.) (k .) (k, .) 8. IT.
i i r ± ai di i i
1 (0.5,0.5) 1.9681 5.0802 3.5747 42.33 89.788
2 (0.073,0.927) 3.5571 4.9737 3.4969 15.62 87.2749
3 (0.4205,0.5795) 2.0694 5.4794 3.8666 42.05 99.401
As expected, the optimal advertising and distribution expenditures for
defending brands are lower than the corresponding expenditures before
attack and their profits increase.
The attacking brand's strategies remain unchanged from Case 2. In
both Cases 2 and 3, the first brand into the market retains market
leadership in terms of unadjusted and adjusted market share. Unadjusted
market shares remain the same whether the defenders react using only
price or a combination of price, advertising and distribution.
-15-
4. Market Structure-Performance-Strategy Relationships
The major market parameters of our model are the market demand M,
the consumer income Y, and the fixed cost of entry F. It is evident
from the form of the profit function that increasing F decreases
profits alone and does not affect any of the optimal attack-defense
strategies
.
Tables 4 and 5 represent sensitivity analyses of the optimal
attack-defense strategies to changes in the market demand M and con-
sumer income Y respectively.
Different values of M, the market demand, can be thought of as
occurring due to two factors: (a) inherent environmental changes,
which is constant during attack and (b) a change in M brought about by
the attack itself. The results deduced below (from Table 4) are inde-
9
pendent of which factor brought about the changes in M.
Proposition 1 . Ceteris paribus, higher market demand implies higher
profits for all brands.
Proposition 2 . Unadjusted post-entry market share for every brand is
independent of the market demand M. Adjusted post-entry market demand,
for each brand, increases with increase in M; however, adjusted market
share leadership changes from the attacker to defending brand 1 with
increase in M.
Proposition 3 . Optimal price for every brand is independent of the
market demand M.
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Proposition 4 . Optimal advertising and distribution levels for every
brand is higher for a market with higher demand M.
Marketing models, typified by H&S, have ignored the effect of
consumer income in choice models. The following propositions, deduced
from Table 5, demonstrate the impact of consumer income on attack-
defense strategies.
Proposition 5 . Ceteris paribus, higher consumer income Y implies
higher profits for all brands.
Proposition 6 . Unadjusted post-entry market share after attack, is
independent of consumer income Y. Adjusted post-entry market demand,
for each brand, increases with increase in Y; however (as in Proposi-
tion 2), adjusted share leadership changes from the attacker to
defending brand 1, with increase in Y.
Proposition 7 . Optimal post-entry price for every brand increases
with higher consumer income Y.
Proposition 8 . Optimal post-entry advertising and distribution levels
for every brand increases with higher consumer income Y.
The following propositions pertain to changes in both the consumer
income Y and market demand M and follow from Tables 4 and 5.
Proposition 9 . The optimal positioning of all brands is independent
of both Y and M.
-19-
Notice chat the attacker obtains highest profits, the first brand
obtains the next highest profits and the second brand the lowest
profits in the market, independent of Y and M. Also, the first brand
obtains highest unadjusted market share followed by he attacker and
the second brand (in that order) , independent of Y and M. This leads
to:
Proposition 10 . The relationship between unadjusted market share and
profits is not raonotonic, i.e., profits increase with increasing
market share in certain ranges of market share and the contrary holds
in certain other ranges of market share.
It should be noted that these propositions are deduced from the
simulation results involving entry into a market with two initial
brands
.
Summarv and Directions for Future Research
In this paper we have generalized the economic model proposed by
Lane (1980), and the marketing analysis suggested by Hauser and Shugan
(1983). We have developed a procedure for computing/identifying the
optimal attack strategies for a new product entry as well as optimal
defense strategies for existing brands in the market.
We have shown that defending in only advertising and/or distribu-
tion is catastrophic when consumer choice depends on price, position
and consumer income only. It is necessary to defend in prices also.
We have also shown that the defenders should drop their advertising
and distribution expenditures upon attack— this is in consonance
with the results of H&S. However, it is worthy to note that these
-20-
results are crucially dependent on the incorporation of the impact of
advertising and distribution expenditures on sales through response
function models (which has a lot of proponents, for example, Wind and
Robertson, 1983, p. 15).
Several propositions relating consumer income Y and market demand
M to optimal-defense strategies have been deduced from simulations.
Especially notable among these is the importance of estimating con-
sumer income in determining entry (go-no go) decisions.
Other open questions which are currently under study, are
(i) the optimal attack strategy for a firm which already has
some brands in this market, incorporating synergy (modelled
as in Sudharshan and Kumar (1984)),
(ii) the development of a procedure for generating the optimal
strategies for attack and defense considering more than two
attributes, and
(iii) the incorporation of other distributions for consumer tastes.
-21-
Footnotes
Other important articles in this area are those by Hotelling
(1929), Leland (1974) and Lancaster (1975).
?
"Referred to henceforth as H&S.
3
The analytical intractability of the H&S model involve solving
equations with trigonometric functional forms. We would gladly supply
details to the interested reader.
4
This reduction by one attribute results for any number of
original attributes, if we can specify a technology constraint of the
t
from E w.(j), where t = number of original attributes and i is the
j-l *
'
ith combination of the j=l,...,t original attributes. This constraint
reduces the search space in finding the optimal brand positions. Also,
our results can be generalized to situations with more than two
attributes. The complexity of the search space for optimal brand
positions increases, but our general results hold.
This curve best suited Little's (1979) five requirements for re-
sponse functions.
(.
Repositioning may not be viable because of a large fixed cost F
associated with it.
The interested reader is referred to Lane (1980) for proofs of
existence of Nash equilibrium in prices. Existence of such equilibrium
in advertising and distribution follows a similar line of proof.
g
In section 4 we shall show that our choice of these values, while
impacting on the specific solutions of positions, prices, advertising,
distribution and profits, does not in any way change our general con-
clusions .
9
The attack-defense strategies do not depend on the change in M
from pre-attack levels to post-attack levels since the price, adver-
tising and distribution levels are computed following Nash equilibrium
and the defending brands cannot re-position. This implies that there
is no "memory" of the pre-attack demand level and hence, only the
value of post-attack demand matters.
This proposition seems to suggest that errors in estimating market
demand could make the difference between entering and not entering a
market, e.g., in Table 5, if Y is 5, the profit for the new product
is 40.5837. Suppose the hurdle profit to be cleared by the new product
for entry is 45. Then if Y is estimated to be 5, a no-go decision
will result. However, if Y is estimated to be 10, then an enter
decision will result.
-10-
This proposition, like proposition 5, seems to suggest the impor-
tance of estimation Y in making an entry decision. The difference be-
tween the two implications is that if the entering brand is required
to be market share leader (rather than a profit hurdle clearer), then
mis-estimation could lead to a wrong entry/no entry decision.
-23-
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Appe ndix
This section contains all the computational equations used in the
calculation of the various strategies and performance measures (such as
unadjusted market share, profits) for the initial equilibrium as well
as the equilibrium after entry.
The notations used in this section are:
i = index for firm, i=l,2,3
p. = price
k . = advertising expenditure
ai t> r
k,. = distribution expendituredi r
(w. , z.) = brand position on attributes (w, z)
constrained to w + z = 1 , i=l,2,3
B . = unadjusted market share
A(k .) = advertising response level (ADBUDG form)
3.1
D(k,.) = distribution response level (ADBUDG form)
di
c = marginal cost
F = fixed cost of entry
M = total market demand
it . = profit given by
it.. = (p. - c)8.MA(k . )D(k, .) - F - k . - k , . .ij r i i ai di ai di
Th e adjusted market share is computed by g .A(k . )D(k,.) and the adjusted
1 3.1 Q
1
demand bv 3 .MA(k . )D(k,.).
1 ai di
Initial Equilibrium
( 1 ) Location Strategy Computation :
a) For fixed (w z. ) , and for every (w ? , z ? ) compute the Nash
equilibrium price, advertising and distribution strategies (this
A-
2
computation is discussed below). Brand 2's optimal strategy is to com-
pute (w*(w., z
1
), z*(w
1
,
z
x
)) = argmax. tt
2
2
,
z
? )
given (Wj, z.,)
i.e., optimal location to maximize profits.
b) Brand l's optimal strategy is to compute
max. it .
(w
L
,
z
:
)
given w*^, z^
Z2^W1' ZV)
i.e., optimal location knowing firm 2's reactive optimal location and
the ensuing Nash equilibrium in the other strategies. This is possible
due to the assumption of perfect foresight for brand 1.
(2) Nash Price, Advertising and Distribution Strategies Computation
Given (w
,
z ) and (w , z_),
p -
c
-£—
-
- £n(Y- Pl ) = 2n( Zl /z 2 )
- ;tn(Y-p
2
) (1)
P 2~C
y fc
„N . r 2/ fc „ v „2 , ...^ ^
llv . Kl
- Zn(Y- Po ) = £n(w./w ) - £n(Y- Pl ) (2)
(pr c) 8lMD(kdl)^-- 1 =0
al
(3)
(p
1
-c)6
1
MA(k
al ) I
|£-- 1 = (4)
al
(p2-c)8 2MD(kd2 ) -|±-- 1 = (5)
a2
A-
3
(p
2
-c)0
2
MA(k
a2 ) ^|2_ -1 = (6)
d2
Z
l ^"Pl 5
where g = (7)
r
2 1,
2
W
l
2
- 1 - 6 2 (8)
a_ a„-l
3 3 1c3A , 2 3 ai ...
3k
.
v
l
7
2
(
a
2
,
a
2)
a
3
+ k
ai
b
2
b
2
_1
3D
. ( „ b,)^L_k« (10)3k.. x "1' . 2
3 di
See Lane (1980) for a deviation of equations (1) and (2), which repre-
sent first order conditions of profit maximization with respect to
price and equations (7) and (8), which represent the market demand
allocation through consumer utility maximization. Equations (3)-(6)
represent first order conditions with respect to advertising and dis-
tribution while (9) and (10) are the partial derivatives of the ADBUDG
type advertising and distribution functions.
a) Using (1) and (2), compute p* p*
.
b) Using (3), (4), (7), (9) and (10), compute k*^ k^.
c) Using (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10), compute k*
2
,
k*
2
»
This gives the equilibrium price, advertising and distribution strategies
as functions of (w
,
z, ) and (w , z ? ), to be used in the optimal location
strategy computation discussed earlier.
A-
4
Equilibrium after entry
Consider the positions of brands 1, 2 and 3 in the order 3-1-2,
W
3
W
l
W
2
i.e., w. < w < w
?
(or alternatively — < — < —). Given (w* z* ) and
j JL *— oio
(w* z*), (this is possible since brands 1 and 2 are assumed not to use
repositioning as a defensive strategy),
(Po-C)
(Y_ )
- *n(Y-p
3
) = Jln(z
3
/ Zl ) - in(Y- Pl ) (11)
(p
T
-c)
(Y_ }
- in(Y- Pl ) - ct1
- Y1
*n(Y-p
2
) - (l-y^ *n(Y-p
3
) (12)
(P 2-c)
j^- r- - ^n(Y-p 2 ) = £n(w 2 /Wl ) - Zn(Y- Pl ) (13)
Z
3
Z
3
W
l 1
Y" P
3
- -£ An _£ + £n _£ - i_ £ n ( i) = o (14)
w
3
Z]
_
w
3
w
3
Y- Pl
Jln(w
2
)£n(z /z ) + Zn(w Hn( z /z ) + £n(w )£n(z /z^
where a, = (15)
1 w z
£n _£ . _£.
Z
2
W
3
W
l .
Z
3
z w
Y, = — (16)
1 w z
z w
For 1=1,2,3
(p.-c)B
i
MD(k
d
.) T^- 1
= (17)
ai
(p.-c)3,MA(k .) -^- -i = o (18)
i i ai 3k.,
di
A-
5
Z
3
(Y
-P 3 >
where g = (19)
3 w z
*n[— • —
]
Z
l
W
3
. r
W
2 •
(Y" P 2 }
*n[
w7 ty^t
w z
*n — • —
Z
2
W
l
(20)
S
1
= 1 " 83 " 2
' (21)
See Lane (1980) for a derivation of equations (11)-(13), (15) and (16)
which represent profit derivatives with respect to price and equations
(19)-(21) which represent market demand allocation. Equation (14)
represents the first order condition for otpimal positioning (variable
z~) of attacker. Equations (17) and (18) represent first order condi-
tions with respect to advertising and distribution.
a) Using (15), (16) and the fact that w. + z. = 1, equations (11)-
(14) are four non-linear equations involving (p , p., p., z„) which can
be solved for (p* p* p* z*).
b) Using (9), (10), (17), (18) and the corresponding equation choice
in (19)-(21), the strategic variables (k*., k*
.
) can be obtained for each
ai di
1-1,2,3.
The above procedure is used when the defensive strategy for brands
1 and 2 encompass price, advertising and distribution (as in Case (3)
of the paper). For Case (2), which entails defense only in prices, the
A-
6
computations regarding (k*
. ,
k*
.
) i=l,2 are omitted and these brands arer ° ° ai di
assumed to use the same levels of advertising and distribution as pre-
scribed by the initial equilibrium. For Case (1), which entails defense
in advertising and/or distribution only, equations (11) and (14) are
solved for p* and z* , for fixed p 1 and p~ given by the pre-entry levels.
Note that we assumed an ordering of 3-1-2 initially, which implies
the attacker to position somewhere before brand 1 along the w-axis (or
f-axis) . We can derive alternative equations (11)-(13), (15), (16) and
(19)-(21) for the cases when the ordering is 1-3-2 or 1-2-3. As intui-
tively expected, these latter cases do not provide the optimal entry
point for the attacker.
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